ITU

International Telecommunication Union

Camilla Morales & Sebastiaan Dousi

Committee Chairs

Topics

Topic 1

Question The question of regulating global digital infrastructure to prevent cyber instability and conflict.

Description Investigate the regulation of global digital infrastructure to prevent cyber instability and international conflict.

Topic 2

Question The question of strengthening international cooperation to secure critical communications networks.

Description Evaluate the importance of international cooperation in securing critical communications networks.

Countries

  • Argentina is a federal republic in South America with a tradition of supporting open internet governance and multi-stakeholder processes. It has been active in ICANN and other internet governance bodies and brings a broadly liberal approach to ITU negotiations, supporting international cooperation on infrastructure security while resisting frameworks that would concentrate control in state hands or exclude non-governmental actors.

  • Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy with close intelligence ties to the United States and United Kingdom through the Five Eyes alliance. It shares the US position on resisting expanded ITU authority and is particularly focused on the security risks of Chinese telecommunications equipment in global infrastructure. Australia supports international cooperation on communications security within frameworks that preserve open internet principles and democratic values.

  • Brazil is a federal republic and one of the world's most influential voices on internet governance, having hosted the landmark NETmundial conference in 2014 that produced a multi-stakeholder model for internet governance. Brazil supports international cooperation on securing digital infrastructure but insists that governance frameworks must include civil society and private sector voices, not just states. It occupies a bridge position between developed and developing country perspectives.

  • Canada is a federal parliamentary democracy closely aligned with the United States on internet governance and digital infrastructure issues. It supports multi-stakeholder approaches and is sceptical of ITU expansion into areas traditionally governed by the private sector and civil society. Canada brings a rights-based framing to communications security issues and tends to resist frameworks that could enable state censorship or surveillance under the guise of infrastructure protection.

  • China is a single-party state that has pioneered a model of sovereign internet governance, maintaining the "Great Firewall" to control information flows within its borders. It has been a consistent advocate within the ITU for expanding the organisation's regulatory authority over the internet and has supported proposals that would give states greater technical control over national internet infrastructure. China views the current multi-stakeholder model as a vehicle for US dominance and actively promotes an alternative state-centric governance paradigm.

  • Estonia is a small parliamentary republic in Northern Europe and one of the world's most advanced digital societies, having moved nearly all government services online. It was the target of a major Russian cyberattack in 2007 that became a landmark case in international cyber policy, and it has since been a leading advocate for strong international frameworks to protect digital infrastructure and communications networks. Estonia supports robust ITU cooperation and is a founding voice in NATO cyber defence doctrine.

  • France is a unitary presidential republic and a major European power with a strong tradition of state-led industrial and digital policy. It supports coordinated international regulation of digital infrastructure and views the ITU as a legitimate forum for establishing global communications standards. France has been active in EU-level digital regulation and brings that experience to international negotiations, generally favouring rules-based frameworks while remaining alert to sovereignty considerations.

  • Germany is a federal parliamentary democracy with strong constitutional privacy protections and a sophisticated digital economy. It supports open, rules-based internet governance within multi-stakeholder frameworks and is deeply influenced by its EU obligations under GDPR and the Digital Markets Act. Germany is sceptical of ITU frameworks that could undermine democratic accountability or enable state surveillance, and it brings significant technical and regulatory expertise to international communications negotiations.

  • India is the world's most populous democracy with a rapidly expanding digital economy and a complex position on internet governance. It has called for greater multilateral oversight of the internet, at times aligning with China and Russia on state-centric governance proposals, but also defends the multi-stakeholder model in other contexts. India seeks frameworks that give developing nations more influence over global digital infrastructure while preserving domestic regulatory sovereignty.

  •  Iran is an Islamic republic under theocratic governance with a heavily filtered and monitored national internet. It supports ITU frameworks that expand state authority over digital infrastructure and communications and has aligned with China and Russia on these positions in international forums. Iran views internet governance through a sovereignty lens and regards Western opposition to state control as interference in its domestic affairs.

  • Japan is a constitutional monarchy with a sophisticated digital economy and strong alignment with Western positions on internet governance. It supports voluntary, consensus-based approaches to securing communications networks and is wary of binding ITU frameworks that could empower authoritarian governments to restrict or monitor communications infrastructure. Japan consistently advocates for an open, interoperable global internet.

  • Kenya is a presidential republic and a digital innovation hub for sub-Saharan Africa, home to a thriving fintech sector and one of the continent's most connected populations. It supports international cooperation to secure communications infrastructure, particularly as African nations become more deeply integrated into global digital networks. Kenya approaches ITU negotiations from a development perspective, seeking frameworks that expand connectivity while providing security without stifling growth.

  • Nigeria is a federal republic with a growing digital economy and limited regulatory capacity for managing complex communications infrastructure. It approaches ITU negotiations primarily from a connectivity and development perspective, supporting international cooperation that can help bridge its infrastructure gaps. Nigeria has not firmly aligned with either the state-centric or multi-stakeholder camp and tends to take a pragmatic, interest-based approach to these negotiations.

  • Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with a state-directed approach to digital infrastructure and a strong preference for sovereign control over national communications networks. It supports ITU frameworks that give governments greater authority over digital infrastructure within their borders and has aligned with China and Russia on key votes within the ITU to expand state power over internet governance. Saudi Arabia views digital infrastructure regulation as a matter of national security and sovereignty.

  • South Africa is a constitutional republic and the most digitally developed economy in Africa, with an active voice in international technology governance forums. It supports international cooperation to secure critical communications networks and approaches ITU negotiations with a focus on ensuring that developing nations are not excluded from governance decisions that shape their digital futures. South Africa often speaks on behalf of the African Group in ITU negotiations.

  • South Korea is a presidential republic with one of the world's most advanced digital infrastructures and a highly connected population. It is a major technology exporter and broadly aligned with the US-led model of open, multi-stakeholder internet governance. South Korea is cautious about ITU frameworks that could expand state control over digital infrastructure and tends to resist moves that it views as fragmenting the global internet.

  • The United Arab Emirates is a federation of hereditary monarchies with a highly managed digital environment and a government that maintains significant oversight of communications infrastructure. The UAE supports frameworks that give states greater authority to regulate their national networks and has invested heavily in domestic digital infrastructure under close state oversight. It aligns broadly with the Gulf state bloc on internet governance issues.

  • The United Kingdom is a major digital economy with significant intelligence and cybersecurity capabilities, and a longstanding preference for multi-stakeholder internet governance models. It resists ITU frameworks that would give governments greater control over global digital infrastructure and views with concern proposals that could legitimise state surveillance or internet fragmentation. Post-Brexit, the UK continues to align closely with US and EU positions on these issues.

  • The United States is the birthplace of the modern internet and the home of most of the world's dominant digital platforms and infrastructure companies. It strongly opposes expanding ITU authority over the internet, preferring the existing multi-stakeholder model governed through bodies like ICANN. The USA views proposals to give the ITU binding regulatory power over digital infrastructure as vehicles for authoritarian governments to control or surveil their populations online.

  • Russia is an authoritarian state that has developed domestic legislation enabling it to disconnect the Russian internet from the global network, and has used its influence in the ITU to advance proposals for state control over digital infrastructure. Russia views the existing internet governance model as reflecting Western geopolitical interests and supports a fundamental reordering that would give sovereign states binding authority over communications networks within their territories.